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Abstract
The macroeconomic policies undertaken by Brazilian policymakers during the
60’s, 70’s, 80’s, and 90’s—namely high growth of money supply, huge budget deficits,
and the excessive use of inflation tax—created an inflation crisis comparable to
Germany’s hyperinflationary period. Consequently, the effects of high inflation on
different Brazilian economic variables have become interesting and challenging subjects
to macroeconomists. This paper attempts to describe the effect of high inflation on
output in Brazil between 1975 and 2002. By running a simple linear regression model, I
find that, unlike many other studies, there is a positive relationship between inflation and
output in Brazil during this period. More specifically, the results suggest that a 1%
increase in average inflation produces a 0.0066% increase in output. This result is
possible due to the Brazilian government’s use of inflation to promote growth (Tobin
Effect). Furthermore, this action by the government is responsible for the enormous
income inequality found in Brazil.
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1. Introduction
In the 1960’s inflation began to rise in Brazil. Very soon it became the number
one problem of the Brazilian economy. Every administration that took over the
government employed a formula to try to eliminate inflation. Their policies included
wage and price controls, constant changes in fiscal and monetary policies, fiscal reforms,
fixed exchange rates, and changes in currency. However, the government’s inability to
balance its budget, fight corruption, and make a concerted effort to eradicate inflation
resulted in enormous budget deficits, high growth of the money supply and, ultimately,
hyperinflation throughout the 80’s and 90’s. What became clear was the government’s
abusive use of inflation tax to finance its spending. Ruge-Murcia (1999) describes the
relationship between high inflation and the process of creating money to finance a budget
deficit using data on Brazil between January 1980 and December 1989.
During these four decades of frustrated macroeconomic policy the standards of
living of the Brazilian population worsened. Poverty multiplied and spread around urban
centers, while the concentration of income on the hands of a minority put Brazil in the
top of the list of countries with most cruel economic and social inequality in the world.
These facts grasp the interest of macroeconomists, challenging them to study the effects
of the Brazilian hyperinflation on different economic variables. For example, De Paula
(1998) studies behavior changes of private banks due to high inflation, while Dole, et al
(2000) describes the interaction between workers and firms under hyperinflation.
In this paper I study the effect of high inflation on output in Brazil from 1975 to
2002. By running a simple linear regression on Brazilian quarterly data I find that
inflation positively affects output. Moreover, I find that a 1% increase in average
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inflation causes a 0.0066% increase in output. The results suggest that the government
used an inflation-fosters-growth mentality during the period in study, which significantly
contributed to such a positive relationship.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the data on
GDP and inflation used in this study. In section 3 ,1 present the empirical work and
discuss the results. Section 4 concludes the paper with some additional remarks. As a
complementary part to this paper, section 5 provides the reader with a synopsis of
Brazilian economic policy from 1964 to 2002 in appendix A and tables and graphs
showing the data used in the study in appendix B.
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2. Data Description
2.1 GDP
In this paper I used two different kinds of data on GDP. For analytical purpose, I
used quarterly data on Real Gross Domestic Product for the period from 1975 to 2002.
This data is originated from IPEADATA ('http://www.ipeadata.gov.brT The reason for
this choice is that yearly data would only provide me with 27 observations, which is a
very small sample space for the regression to be significant. Instead, I used quarterly
data, which multiplies the sample by four and allows for better estimations of the model.
Table 2 provides this data, while figure 5 provides a graph of the same.
However, for descriptive purpose, I used throughout the text that appears in
appendix A annual percentage change of Real Gross Domestic Product for the period
from 1964 to 2002 to illustrate Brazilian economic performance. This data is originated
from APECAO XLII. The explanation for this choice is to give the reader a numerical
image of the Brazilian economic situation described in the text. Table 3 provides this
data, while figure 6 provides a graph of the same.
2.2 Inflation
Similarly, I have also used two different types of data on Inflation. For the
statistical model, I used quarterly data on the consumer price index for the period from
1975 to 2002. This data is originated from IPEADATA ('http://www.ipeadata.gov.brV
The source provides the monthly data throughout the period. I formed the quarterly data
by adding together the monthly inflation rates of the months respective to each quarter.
Once again, the reason for such choice is that the quarterly data multiplies the sample by
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four, allowing for better estimations of the model. Table 4 provides this data, while
figure 7 provides a graph of the same.
For descriptive purpose, I used throughout the text that appears in appendix A
annual percentage change in consumer price index for the period from 1964 to 2002 to
illustrate the Brazilian inflationary phenomenon. This data is originated from Library o f
Congress (between 1964 and 1996) and IBGE (between 1997 and 2002). In order to
incorporate both sources I used the following proportion:

1997 Inflation rate = [(1996 IBGE rate) / (1996 Lib. Cong, rate)] x (1997 IBGE rate)

I incorporated both sources in order to have a complete set of data to cover the entire
period of study. This data was also used to give the reader a numerical image of the
Brazilian inflationary phenomenon described in the text of appendix A. Table 5 provides
this data, while figure 8 provides a graph of the same.
2.3 Miscellaneous
Throughout section 3 of this paper I used graphs and a table of different economic
variables to illustrate Brazilian economic performance during the period under study.
Figure 1 shows Capital Formation from 1970 to 2002. Figure 2 shows Interest Rate and
Inflation from 1975 to 2002. Figure 3 shows the Population Living Below Poverty Line
from 1977 to 1999. Figure 4 shows the Gini Coefficient from 1977 to 1999. Figures 1,
3, and 4 originated from IPEADATA (http://www.ipeadata.gov.br). Also, figure 2 was
made from data that originated from IPEADA TA (http://www.ipeadata.gov.br). In
addition, table 1 shows the top 10 countries with highest Gini Coefficients.
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3. Empirical Work
In order to study the relationship between inflation and output in Brazil I used the
following simple linear regression model:

y - GDP
log(y) = a + p[log(xi)] + y(x2) +€, where

xi = GDPt-i (lag of GDP)
X2

= rate of change in prices (inflation)

This model relates the log of GDP to the log of lagged GDP (GDPt-i) and the rate
of change in prices (inflation). The above relation allows for the measurement of the
magnitude of the relationship between inflation and output. The lagged of GDP serves as
a proxy for all other variables affecting GDP. This relation is in line with the dictum of
Rational Expectation Hypothesis. These specifications also allow us a better
understanding of the effect of the effect of inflation on output. The table below shows
the estimation results.
Table I
GDP is dependent variable: 1975 - 2002 sample, quarterly data
Variable

Coefficient

Standard errors

P Value

Intercept
Log[GDPn]
Inflation

+ 0.07069
+ 0.99843
+ 0.00660

0.02230
0.00156
0.00047498

0.0020
<0.0001
<0.0001

The results in Table 1 show a strong positive relationship among the variables.
This is evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient of the variables and the pW

values. In addition, since this model relates the rate of change in GDP to the rate of
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change in prices, the coefficient of the inflation variable also illustrates the magnitude of
inflation’s effect on output. It can be interpreted as follows: a 1% increase in inflation
produces a 0.0066% increase in GDP. The corresponding p value (the smallest error
level at which the null can be rejected) for this coefficient proves this result to be
statistically significant (<0.0001), implying that this finding is robust. Furthermore, the
R-Square (the proportional variation in the dependent variable that can be explained by
the model) found in the model is extremely high (0.9997), suggesting that this model is
successful in estimating such relationship.
Our results are not consistent a number of other studies for many highly
developed countries. In developed countries high inflation produces uncertainty and
leads to lower investment and production. Faria and Cameiro (2001) found that in the
short run there exists a negative effect from high inflation on output, while Engelbrecht
and Langley (2001) described that high rates of inflation are associated to negative per
capita GDP growth rate. Andres and Hernando (1997) depicted a negative effect of
inflation on per capita income, whereas in Braumann (2000), high inflation had a
negative impact on output.
The explanation for a negative impact of rampant inflation on output relies on the
costs of inflation. In the presence of high inflation, individuals rush their transactions so
as to rid themselves of depreciating cash. Besides, knowing inflation erodes the value of
money, individuals avoid this decrease in value by holding less money (shoeleather cost).
Holding less money means more trips to the bank, time that could have been spent
producing goods and services. In addition, other costs of rampant inflation arise from the
misallocation of resources. For once, there is the cost of updating prices (menu cost),

since firms must change prices more often during a period of high inflation. This
represents a misallocation of resources, as the same resources could have been used on
investment on physical or human capital for the expansion of production. Furthermore,
high inflation undermines the confidence of investors about the future course of monetary
policy and reduces total factor productivity, worsening the long-run macroeconomic
performance of the economy.
In the case of Brazil during the period in study, high inflation did not hinder GDP
growth. In fact, the opposite is the case. The Brazilian government used inflation to
promote growth. They relied on what’s known as the Tobin Effect. As Tobin (1965)
suggests, an increase in the inflation rate causes a greater holding of capital relative to
money, increasing output and consumption. This study followed Mundell (1963), which
argued that anticipated inflation is likely to raise the money interest rate by less than the
rate of inflation itself. Ahmed and Rogers (1996) showed that in the long run the effect
of inflation on output is positive (“Tobin type effect”). Policymakers strongly believed
on this idea that inflation buys growth. Therefore, they took advantage of the commonly
seen sneaky, short-lived increases in inflation to temporarily fool the economy into
growing faster than it normally would.
Within a microeconomic scope, this mechanism also made sense for Brazilian
policymakers. The Brazilian high inflation experience persisted for decades, creating a
social phenomenon called inflationary culture. The population became accustomed to
price increases and began to anticipate inflation. By anticipating inflation, individuals
were able to work their ways around it. They understood that inflation automatically
reduced people’s wealth. Therefore, to accumulate the desired wealth, individuals held a
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fraction of their income to meet their immediate needs and saved the rest, thus driving
down the real interest rate. Petrucci (1999) found a positive effect of the money growth
rate on capital, labor and output that gives support to the Tobin Effect. Greater saving
means greater capital accumulation and thus faster output growth. As figure 1 illustrates,
capital accumulation indeed followed an upward trend during the period in study.
Figure 1

However, the interest rate did not seem to fall when inflation increased like the Tobin
Effect suggests. According to figure 2, interest rate appears to follow closely the unstable
behavior of inflation.
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Figure 2
Interest Rate and Inflation, Brazil - 1975 to 2002

What, then, went wrong with the model? The answer is: you cannot save what
you do not have. Those individuals who had enough wealth indeed increased their rate of
savings. But they represented a minority. The vast majority of the Brazilian population
did not have high enough levels of wealth to divide it up into money for immediate
transactions and savings. Those, instead, watched prices go up and their money lose its
purchasing power. Braumann (2001) shows that high inflation reduces real wages
through a shift in relative prices, a mechanism that may contribute to rising poverty
during periods of high inflation. This unfair system lasted for a long time; long enough
to be responsible for the multiplication of poverty and the development of huge ghettos
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around Brazilian urban centers. With an annual periodicity (despite missing the years of
1980, 1991, and 1994), figure 3 illustrates the number of people in Brazil that live below
the poverty line. From 1977 to 1999 the average people living below the poverty line in
Brazil was 53.27 million, reaching a low of 37.60 million people in 1986 and a high of
63.63 million people in 1984.
Figure 3

This horrendous stage of poverty that Brazil displays is the result of the
concentration of income on the hands of a minority. Also displaying an annual
periodicity (and missing the years of 1980, 1991, and 1994), figure 4 shows the Gini
Coefficient for Brazil, which is a statistic used to measure how evenly income is
distributed. The closer the Gini Coefficient is to 1.00 the more uneven is the income
distribution. Figure 4 shows that Brazil has had a very high and steady level of economic
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and social inequality, since its Gini Coefficient has averaged 0.603 and reached a low of
0.583 in 1992 and a high of 0.637 in 1989 during the period under study.
Figure 4

In fact, Brazil is the 5th worst country in the world when it comes to income distribution.
This is shown in table 2 below
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Table 2
Top 10 Countries with Highest Gini Coefficient
Country
Rank
Sierra Leone
1.
Central African Republic
2.
Nicaragua
3.
4.
Bolivia
Brazil
5.
6.
Honduras
7.
South Africa
8.
Chile
Paraguay
9.
10.
Colombia
Source: http ://www.nationmaster.com

Gini Coefficient
63 (1989)
60(1993)
59 (1998)
59(1997)
59(1997)
59(1997)
59(1993- 1994)
58 (1996)
58 (1998)
57(1996)

Brazilian policymakers tried to maintain growth using inflation but, as
policymakers usually do, they failed to consider the long term effects of that measure.
Kasa (1999) advises that monetary authorities may come to believe that there is an
exploitable relationship between inflation and output, even when no such relationship
exists, which provides a reason why monetary policy may be subject to a persistent
inflation bias. Also, Mallik and Chowdhury (2001) provide evidence of a long-run
positive relationship between GDP growth rate and inflation, adding that moderate
inflation is helpful to growth, but faster economic growth feeds back into inflation.
Unlike policymakers, economists, have the ability to study the long-term effects
of policies before their implementation, since they do not depend on the political process.
Economists, such as Gylfason and Herbertsson (2001) know that inflation in excess of
10-20 percent per year is generally detrimental to growth. They agree with Fisher et al
(2002) who suggest that high inflation is associated with poor macroeconomic
performance. In the case of Brazil, poor economic performance came in terms of the
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Brazilian economy not performing to its potential between the 1960’s and 1990’s. The
result, as known, is a four-decade turbulent period of low growth (including two
recessionary periods) that seriously jeopardized Brazil’s future economic health.
One other feature of this simple linear regression model that needs clarification is
the intercept variable. The intercept term cannot be explained by the explanatory
variables, since it represents the effects of the omitted variables and misspecifications of
the model. In addition to the lagged values of GDP and inflation rate, current GDP is
also determined by factors such as the level o f investment, the magnitude of government
spending and taxes, net exports, the stage of technological knowledge, and the quantity of
physical capital, human capital, and natural resources. This task, however, is beyond the
scope of this paper.
Additionally, the use of more sophisticated econometric techniques also could be
used to extract better results from this study, such as using time series analysis,
cointegration, and other techniques to study the joint properties of the series. This option
is what I look forward to in the near future, as I dive deeper into the realm of economic
analysis and prepare myself for post-graduate work.
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4. Concluding Remarks
Using quarterly data on inflation and GDP, 1975 - 2002, this paper presents a
positive relationship between high inflation and output. The findings contradict some
current research that proposes a negative impact of high inflation on output. According
to Barbosa, this outcome is a product of unbalanced economic development due to
frequent mistaken policy decisions. Indeed, excessive government spending and
recurring federal budget deficits significantly contributed to the economic instabilities of
the period in study, namely high inflation and unemployment.
Balancing the budget overtime would alleviate the need for the Brazilian Central
Bank to monetize the government’s debt. Also, a responsible fiscal policy would allow
for sensible monetary policy which, in turn, removes inflationary pressures that result
from extreme money growth. These steps would definitely enhance the economy.
However, some economists believe that prudent macroeconomic policies are only part of
the answer. According to Acemoglu (2003), countries pursuing poor macroeconomic
policies also have weak institutions, ineffective enforcement of property rights for
investors, widespread corruption, and a high degree of political instability. This view not
only applies to Brazil, but should be determinedly considered by policymakers if the
country is to strive in its quest to becoming a modernized nation.
In order for Brazil to overcome the unfortunate experience of low growth paired
with social inequality, strengthening institutions, enforcing property rights, and reducing
corruption are only the beginning steps. Future governments will also have to develop
policies to address several areas of the economy that have demonstrated weaknesses.
Those include: better stabilization policies, greater investment in human capital,
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improvement of the monetary regime to a more stable one that includes fiscal discipline,
and stronger equity considerations that include the improvement of social infrastructures
such as health care, education, public transportation systems, and housing for the poor.
These recommendations can be seen as a framework for Brazilian policymakers to use to
speed up the development process of the Brazilian economy.

5. Appendices
5.1 Appendix A
Synopsis of Brazilian economic policy, 1964 - 2002
During the 1960’s the political and economic future of Brazil was very uncertain.
High inflation, an enormous external debt, the constant devaluation of the currency, and
the lack of parity between price and wage increases created a social tension never seen
before in the Brazilian society. The immense regional economic disparities, the
development of substantial poverty, and the massive migration of rural residents into
industrialized cities contributed to the rapid spread of Communism during the Populist
Republic.
Fearing the uncertainty of the country’s future, the Military decided it was time
for a change. In 1964, the Military overthrew President Joao Goulart and took control of
government. Tired of being simply the judge of national politics, the Military became the
absolute power. They instated a dictatorship-like regime that switched presidents every
five years, with presidents being chosen among high army officials. At this point all
decisions, including political and economic, were made by the Army.

The Military Regime (1964 -1984)
The new militaiy regime faced three basic problems with the economic sector:
rampant inflation, economic stagnation due to lack of investments, and a deficit in the
balance of payments. This situation kept the country in a sub-developed state, making it
more vulnerable to the infiltration of communism. Promoting economic development
became not only an issue of national security but also the biggest challenge of Mai.
Castello Branco, the first president of Brazil under the military regime.
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Castello Branco Administration (1964 to 1967):
W
The Castello Branco administration had two priorities: fighting inflation and
attracting foreign investments. In order to fight inflation (83.9% in 1964), the new
administration restricted credit, reduced the government deficit (US$3 billion in 1964),
eliminated subsidies to gas, paper, wheat, and rent, increased taxes and tariffs over public
services, and promoted a freeze in all salaries. To stimulate the entry of foreign capital,
the Castello administration improved the conditions for profit by abolishing a law against
the remittance of profits abroad and reduced taxes over profits for foreign companies who
re-invested in production or imported machinery considered of national interest.
The actions taken by the Castello administration contributed to the low increase in
GDP (2.4% in 1965), proven by the increase in the number of bankruptcies and the
decrease in worker’s purchasing power (due to the wage freeze). The reliance on foreign
capital created a dependence on multinational corporations by the Brazilian economy.
Those corporations started to associate themselves to, and absorb, Brazilian companies,
beginning a process o f internationalization of the economy. Good examples of this
process are VEMAG S. A., absorbed by Volkswagen, and Banco Lar Brasileiro absorbed
by Chase Manhattan.
Most important, this administration was characterized by the beginning of intense
government intervention on internal and external economic relations. This was evident in
the greater participation of military officials in national companies and in the board of
trustees of multinational corporations, a trend that did not diminish in future
administrations under the military regime.

Costa E Silva Administration (1967 to 1969):
As the second president during the military regime, Mai. Costa E Silva tried to
correct the negative effects of the economic policy from the prior administration and
provide conditions for solid economic growth. The new economic team gave the private
sector conditions to develop by stimulating investments, giving incentives to the export
sector to expand Brazil’s external commerce, and investing heavily in health and
education to supply urban and industrial centers with workers with a minimum of
professional capacity.
Government participation in the economy increased during this administration.
The involvement of state-owned companies in national production was amplified. The
Brazilian middle class was especially targeted, as they benefited from the growing
demand for labor in the services sector, extended internal credit, and an expanded
national housing system by the government. These measures increased the middle
classes’ purchasing power, enabling them to buy cars, houses, and house appliances. The
economic policy of this administration laid down the bases for the “Brazilian Miracle.”
Medici Administration (1969 to 1974)
Therefore, when Emilio Garrastazu Medici became president in 1969, he not only
had an economy technically ready to grow, but he also had the experience of watching
previous administrations try to solve the country’s economic problems. Due to the failure
of previous administrations to eliminate inflation, the Medici administration chose to
institutionalize it (keeping it around 20% annually). The government began to control
inflation by using a process of automatic monetary correction1. This process affected

1 The process of automatic monetary correction consisted of the government correcting wages and
investments by the inflation rate of the previous month.

Brazilians in different ways. The wages of lower sectors of the Brazilian society were
kept below the cost of living. The wages of higher sectors of the society, however,
increased. They took advantage of the fact that companies began to hire high-skilled
labor, such as managers and specialized technicians. Consequently, the middle and
higher classes increased demand for durable goods, food, expensive liquor, luxurious
cloth, and so on.
This great desire to consume stimulated the industry to resume its economic
growth. Besides, companies benefited from the liberal policy of credit, the low wages
earned by blue-collar workers, the opening of international commerce, and the ease to
obtain loans abroad. Brazil began to export not only raw materials and semiindustrialized products, but also industrialized products such as canned meat,
concentrated and dehydrated fruit juice, soluble coffee, clothing, televisions, and radios.
This six-year period (1968 to 1974), characterized by accelerated growth (10.72%
average GDP growth) and low inflation (20.94% average inflation rate), was named the
“Brazilian Economic Miracle.”
The “Brazilian Economic Miracle” had, however, negative long-term effects in
the country. First, this period was responsible for the income concentration by the higher
layers of society. The lower sector of the society, who now had jobs and benefited from
new lines of credit, was seduced by society’s appeal to consume. The result was a cycle
of progressive indebtedness by the population in order to buy televisions, radios, cars,
and other goods. Second, this concentration of income became concentration of capital.
Small producers and businesspeople were sacrificed by excessive taxation and the
government’s price control system, while bigger companies producing for exportation
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benefited from tax incentives. Eventually, bigger companies absorbed the small firms,
resulting in concentration of capital. Another result of the “Brazilian Economic Miracle”
was the rapid expansion of Brazil’s external debt, which increased from US$4.4 billion in
1969 to US$17.1 billion in 1974 (Dominguez 361), as it was necessary to obtain greater
amounts of foreign capital, factors of production (technology), and raw materials (crude
oil).
Geisel Administration (1974 to 1979)
When Ernesto Geisel took over the presidency in 1974 the “Brazilian Economic
Miracle” appeared to be over. The country could no longer maintain high rates of growth
paired with low rates of inflation, as the expansion that occurred during the “Brazilian
Miracle” went beyond the capacity of the market for factors of production.
Transportation, raw materials, labor, and basic food items became scarce, while the
supply of public services such as water, electricity, and telephones became deficient in
face of the great demand. To solve this problem, the Geisel administration contracted
loans from abroad, imported the products that were missing in the Brazilian market,
broadened exports by penetrating new markets, and substituted imports.
It is important to mention that in 1973 the world market was affected by a
generalized crisis in international finances and the War in the Middle East. Imported
crude oil suffered an incredible price increase, which affected Brazil tremendously, as the
country’s economic model was based on the automobile industry and road transportation.
Despite the poor economic situation abroad, the administration took several loans to pay
for imports, resume economic development, and execute the program of import

W
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substitution. This model of economic expansion deteriorated the country’s international
accounts, increasing the external debt to US$49,9 billion (Dominguez 362).
The government’s economic policy was accompanied by the expansion of
industry, commerce, banks, and the ever-growing consumption by the higher layers of
society. Trying to contain this tendency, the government reduced spending, increased the
price of imports considered superfluous, mandated a salary compression, liberated
interest rates charged by banks for loans to companies, increased the price of gas, and
closed gas stations on weekends and holidays. However, none of these measures worked
as expected. The inflation rate became even higher (85.7% in 1978) due to the oil crisis
and the increases in the price of rice, beans, com, potatoes, onions, and tapioca. The
Brazilian Miracle was definitely over and the country appeared to be heading into a
recession.
Figueiredo Administration (1979 to 1985)
The economic conditions could not be worse when Joao Baptista Figueiredo
became president. In 1979 occurred the second shock in the oil market, followed by the
increase in international interest rates. The new administration tried to execute a program
of economic austerity in order to adjust Brazil’s economy to the global crisis. Measures
to slow down economic activity were taken, including the reduction of fiscal incentives to
exports; the reduction of government spending; and an increase in investment in the
extraction of oil in order to decrease imports. The economic slowdown program lasted
only six months. Under a lot of pressure, the government changed its economic team,
reinstated its previous economic policy of growth, and revoked all measures focusing on
economic slowdown, making economic growth its main objective again.
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The expansionary policy brought difficulties to obtain loans, which forced the
government to adopt a series of restrictive measures. By 1981 the country went into a
deep recession, illustrated by the steep decline in economic activity (GDP fell 4.3%) and
the increase in unemployment (7.9% in 1981). Inflation skyrocketed (109.9% in 1981)
while wages remained unchanged, decreasing the purchasing power of the Brazilian
middle class. The recession greatly affected the state-owned companies, as the
government decreased investment on them to cut spending.
The tough economic times forced the government to ask the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) for help. The IMF agreed to guarantee Brazil’s credibility abroad
so that the country could get loans and attract investments. However, Brazil had to
follow a program of financial and economic stability, which included the following
conditions: large cuts in spending, an increase in exports, and the compression of wages.
The Brazilian economy started being “tutored” by the IMF.
The biggest contribution made by the Figueiredo administration came in the field
of politics. Recognizing that the military regime had weakened due to its inability to
strengthen the Brazilian society and develop the country’s economy, this administration
gave birth to the process of national re-democratization. Several measures were taken
during the five years of the Figueiredo administration in order to turn Brazil back into a
democracy. Finally, on January 15th, 1985, the new president of Brazil was elected.
Brazil entered a new phase in its history: The New Republic.

The New Republic (1985 - present)
At the end of the military regime, the Brazilian economy showed confusing signs.
The 1981-83 recession seemed to be over by the end of 1984. However, inflation
W
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(220.6% in 1984) jeopardized the economy by corroding the purchasing power of
workers and creating a big hole in the public accounts. During the New Republic,
inflation became the great problem of Brazil’s economy. In order to confront inflation,
the government created successive “economic packages,” but yearly inflation rates were
still high. This situation created a social phenomenon called “inflationary culture.” The
population became accustomed to price increases and consumed without any type of
planning.
Sarney Administration (1985 to 1990)
When Jose Sarney took over, the country was stuck in a vicious financial cycle.
That is, entrepreneurs preferred to invest their profits in financial markets, rather than
back in production. This created a lack of investments that only worsened the country’s
producing capability. In order to fight off inflation, promote better income distribution,
^m J

and restart to expand economically, the Sarney administration created the Cruzado Plan.

The Cruzado Plan (February o f 1986)

Implemented on February 28,1986, the Cruzado Plan adopted the following measures:
1.

Switch of currencies from Cruzeiro (Cr$) to Cruzado (Cz$). The government mainly cut
three zeros off of the old currency, using the following proportion: 1 Cruzado is equal to
1,000 Cruzeiros [CzSl.OO = Cr$l,000.00];

2.

Complete freeze of all prices, fares, services, and wages for a year,

3.

A wage increase of 8% for workers in general and 15% for the minimum-wage, in
addition to future readjustments that would be made automatically (wage trigger) every
time inflation added up to 20%, and;

4.

Extinction of the monetary correction. From this point on, wages and investments were
no longer corrected by the inflation rate of the previous month.
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The price-freeze and the wage increase created an exaggerated wave of
consumption: savings accounts were emptied out, while sales reached a maximum.
Consequently, companies increased working hours and labor, and enlarged their
production capacity. The capital invested in financial markets was transferred to the
stock market. It was the beginning of the much-waited economic growth after a
major recession.
Four months later, however, the Cruzado Plan started to fail. Many products
disappeared from the market, as the industry could not keep up with demand.
Entrepreneurs complained they were taken by surprise and that their prices were out of
line. Many products were reintroduced with different packaging to justify price
increases. In November of 1986, the government launched the Cruzado II Plan in order
to readjust the economy.
W

The Cruzado II Plan basically cancelled the price freeze and restored monetary
correction. Tariffs for mail, telephones, electricity, and the prices of fuel, cigarettes,
liquor, and medicine increased considerably. The government also suspended payment
of the interest rates related to the external debt (this way, the country did not have to send
billions of dollars abroad every year). As prices went up, the wage trigger went off
several times. However, since wages could not accompany inflation, people’s purchasing
power decreased. Consequently, sales plummeted and many companies, especially small
and of medium size, broke. Without a solution to inflation, which closed 1986 at
142.3%, the Samey administration switched its economic team.
The new economic team launched on June 16th, 1987 the Bresser Plan. This plan
decreed: a 90-day freeze on prices, wages, and rents; the extinction of the wage trigger;

the creation of a mechanism to adjust prices and salaries every 3 months based on the
average inflation of the previous 3 months; a small devaluation of the Cruzado in relation
to the dollar; and a decrease in government spending.
The result of these measures was, at first, positive: inflation fell while sales had a
small increase, and the level of employment stabilized. However, the country did not
believe in the effectiveness of the new plan and soon the situation reversed itself: prices
went back up, the population’s purchasing power fell, and the government began
repaying the interest rates owed due to the pressure by foreign creditors. Inflation
reached 224.8% in 1987 and GDP only grew by3.5%. On December of 1987, the
government had no other choice than switching its economic team once again.
The new economic team spent the year of 1988 trying to normalize the country’s
economic situation. The result, however, did not show progress: inflation reached
684.5% and GDP fell 0.1%. As an alternative, the government launched a new plan on
January 15th, 1989 called The Summer Plan. The Summer Plan’s measures included: a
new price and wage freeze; the substitution of the Cruzado (Cz$) for the New Cruzado
(NCz$), cutting three zeros off of the old currency and using the proportion 1 New
Cruzado is equal to 1,000 Cruzados [NCz$1.00 = Cz$l,000.00]; the extinction of
monetary correction and creation of a new mechanism for monthly wage adjustment,
based on the inflation of the previous month; and the increase in interest rates to inhibit
consumption and the formation of inventory.
The Summer Plan did not take long to fail. Abusive price readjustments helped
inflation skyrocket. Investors changed all their funds into financial assets such as gold,
dollars, stocks, and overnights, while prices started being announced in dollars. The
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increasing fear of hyperinflation (which reached 1,320%) made 1989 a year of economic
W
terror.
Collor Administration (1990 to 1992)
The expectations towards the newly elected administration were very high. By
the new president’s request, the country decreed a holiday for banks, closing them for
two days. With closed banks, President Fernando Collor de Mello announced his plan to
eliminate inflation.
The Brazil Plan o r the Collor I Plan (M arch of 1990)
The Collor I Plan was composed of several measures, which included:
1.

The return of Cruzeiro (Cr$) as national currency without change in value;

2.

Blockage for 18 months of all bank accounts above NCz$50,000.00;

3.

Partial freeze of prices and wages;

4.

Opening of the economy to foreign investments and gradual reduction of taxes on imports;

5.

Adoption of floating exchange rates;

6.

Increase in taxes and tariffs and creation of a tax over financial transactions;

7.

Administrative reform and reduction of government spending;

8.

Creation of a program to privatize state-owned companies, and;

9.

Reduction to a minimum of state intervention in the economy.

The blockage of all accounts shocked the economy. Technically, the countiy was
leveled: everyone who had money in banks could only use NCz$50,000.00. The
price and wage freezes, however, loosened as soon as May came. Employers and
employees were allowed to negotiate contracts, but the wage trigger was prohibited.
Inflation seemed under control (inflation fell from 224.90% in the first quarter of
1990 to 29.43% in the second quarter of 1990), but recession was a threat to society
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again. Strikes, reduction of working hours, and dismissals contributed to a decrease
in GDP (GDP fell by 4.4% in 1990). Besides, the government could not reduce
spending, which contributed to the poor performance of the economy.
In an attempt to improve the economy, the Collor administration launched on
January 31st, 1991 the Collor II Plan. The Collor II Plan adopted the following measures:
the end of operations “overnight”; an increase in the tax over financial transactions and of
public fares; a price and wage freezes; the readjustment of rents based on salary
variations, and; a new reduction of taxes on imports.
The new plan did not produce significant results. Despite a fall in inflation
(414.7% in 1991), unemployment increased (4.15% in 1991), companies went bankrupt,
and industrial production, as well as economic activity and profits, decreased (GDP only
increased by 1% in 1991). Several products were authorized to have prices readjusted
and, as wages did not increase accordingly, workers saw their purchasing power corrode
again. Poverty multiplied and spread around urban centers in the form of huge ghettos.
The concentration of income on the hands of a minority put Brazil in the top of the list of
countries with most cruel economic and social inequality in the world.
Besides his failure with the economy, President Collor’s credibility was also
affected by accusations of corruption is his administration. These accusations were
investigated and a big corruption system was found involving President Collor, his close
advisor, his secretary, and a few other politicians. In a process that took more than a
year, Collor was impeached and Itamar Franco, the vice-president, took over the
Presidency.

W
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Franco Administration (1992 to 1995)
Fighting off government deficit was the objective of the Franco administration.
Several measures were adopted to meet this objective, including policies to combat tax
evasions and contract defaults, the expansion of privatization of state-owned companies,
cut in costs throughout government, and salary cutbacks. In December of 1993 Fernando
Henrique Cardoso, Minister of the Treasure Department, sent to Congress a group of
economic, financial, and fiscal measures to prepare the economy for the implementation
of the Real Plan in the following year.
The Real Plan (July of 1994)
Contrary to the previous economic plans, the Real Plan was not a package of measures to
shock the economy in a day. The plan was preceded by stages of preparation, which gave the economy
the possibility to accommodate and the government the chance to balance its accounts. In this sense,

\^ s

the Real Plan introduced the following measures:
1.

Creation of a Social Fund of Emergency (FSE), which keeps 15% of the revenue from all
taxes and federal contributions. With this mechanism, the government was able to
guarantee resources without the need to emit currency;

2.

Creation of the Unit of Real Value (URV), a daily index tied to the dollar that began
measuring the present inflation (and no longer the past inflation). The URV was used to
correct federal taxes and public fares;

3.

Conversion of all wages to URV using an average of the 4 previous months. In addition,
they could only be readjusted after 12 months.

4.

Voluntary conversion of all prices to URV, and;

5.

Transformation of URV into national currency, Real (R$), starting July 1st, 1994.

The effects of the Real Plan were immediately felt, as the inflation rate
plummeted (from 2,406.8% in 1994 to 14.8% in 1995). The commerce attracted buyers
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by accepting pre-dated checks and credit cards. The freeze of public fares (electricity,
telephone, and mail), fuel, and important food items decreased the cost of living of those
with lower income. There was an explosion in consumption.

The ease of importing

brought into the country many foreign products such as cars, appliances, food items, and
some luxuries. The evaluation of the Real Plan after its first year was positive and the
population supported the plan. This public sentiment was reflected in the Presidential
elections of 1994, in which Fernando Henrique Cardoso, father of the Real Plan, was
elected President of Brazil.
Cardoso Administration (1995 to 2002)
The new administration brought in reforms they considered essential to modernize
the country, stabilize the economy, and resume economic growth. The most important
changes included the breakdown of monopoly over petroleum and telecommunications,
and alteration in the definition of national company, in order to welcome foreign capital.
During this administration Mercosul—a free-trade area between Brazil, Argentina,
Paraguay, and Uruguay—was implemented. The president also gave continuity to the
Real Plan by promoting a few adjustments to the economy, such as increasing interest
rates to cool off internal demand, and the devaluation of the Real to stimulate exports and
balance the Trade Balance.
With the Real Plan and the control over the currency exchange, the government
controlled inflation at very low levels (2.62% in 1998). However, there were signs of
recession (GDP rose by only 0.2% in 1998), such as a decrease in consumption and
massive layoffs, which resulted in high unemployment (6.32% in 1998) in the industrial
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and agricultural sectors. Also, international dependency helped increase the external
'W
debt.
During the 1998 Asian Crisis, the government tried to save the Real and the
escape of investments by increasing interest rates and by getting help from the IMF. The
country contracted a US$ 40 billion loan and was forced to take measures, such as the
devaluation of the Real, an increase in government revenue, and a decrease in
government spending, which decreased economic activity. From that point on, the
administration tried different measures to keep inflation low, but that came with the price
of low economic growth. By 2002 inflation was once again becoming a problem
(14.71%), mainly as a result of expectations, as the Presidential elections’ poll pointed to
a loss of the government’s candidate to a leftist union leader, member of the Worker’s
Party.
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5.2 Appendix B
Table 2

Quarterly Real Gross Domestic Product (RGDP), 1975 - 2002
GDP
Q uarter
GDP
Q uarter
0.000036367
1984.3
0.000000079616
1975.1
0.000049718
1984.4
0.000000095948
1975.2
0.0001
1985.1
0.00000010009
1975.3
0.0001
1985.2
0.00000010599
1975.4
0.0001
1985.3
0.00000011911
1976.1
0.0002
0.00000014618
1985.4
1976.2
0.0003
0.00000015941
1986.1
1976.3
0.0003
0.00000016946
1986.2
1976.4
0.0004
0.00000018582
1986.3
1977.1
0.0004
0.00000023436
1986.4
1977.2
0.0005
0.00000023668
1987.1
1977.3
0.0009
0.00000024968
1987.2
1977.4
0.0012
0.00000026112
1987.3
1978.1
0.0016
0.00000032409
1987.4
1978.2
0.0025
0.00000035359
1988.1
1978.3
0.0045
0.00000037656
1988.2
1978.4
0.0082
0.00000040630
1988.3
1979.1
0.0157
0.00000050793
1988.4
1979.2
0.0281
0.00000057332
1979.3
1989.1
0.0431
0.00000068017
1989.2
1979.4
0.1021
1980.1
0.00000084453
1989.3
1980.2
0.0000010832
1989.4
0.2747
1980.3
0.0000013115
1.4179
1990.1
1980.4
0.0000015478
2.2431
1990.2
1981.1
0.0000017564
1990.3
3.0525
1981.2
0.0000022198
1990.4
4.8353
1981.3
0.0000024894
1991.1
6.9815
1981.4
0.0000027258
1991.2
10.6985
1982.1
0.0000033456
1991.3
15.4224
1982.2
0.0000044121
1991.4
27.1835
1982.3
0.0000051870
1992.1
49.0106
1982.4
0.0000056864
1992.2
91.1975
1983.1
0.0000060570
1992.3
173.5820
1983.2
0.0000085931
1992.4
327.1687
1983.3
0.000011704
1993.1
666.9203
1983.4
0.000015510
1993.2
1465.1312
1984.1
0.000019395
1993.3
3568.5997
1984.2
0.000027663
1993.4
8396.4631
Source: IPEADATA (http://www.ipeadata.gov.br)

Q uarter
1994.1
1994.2
1994.3
1994.4
1995.1
1995.2
1995.3
1995.4
1996.1
1996.2
1996.3
1996.4
1997.1
1997.2
1997.3
1997.4
1998.1
1998.2
1998.3
1998.4
1999.1
1999.2
1999.3
1999.4
2000.1
2000.2
2000.3
2000.4
2001.1
2001.2
2001.3
2001.4
2002.1
2002.2
2002.3
2002.4

GDP
18881.6267
66458.8108
128495.3868
135368.8548
143063.7107
155012.9519
166058.5240
182056.3304
170503.8368
189621.0214
203395.5504
215366.3184
192912.3453
212193.9891
222703.6578
242933.0418
210605.7343
233103.8582
233974.0969
236504.1875
221628.8614
247581.6956
241182.2048
263453.2042
250866.3657
271619.4524
284896.3058
293872.9541
280473.8204
295488.4797
303346.5847
320751.4792
295848.2780
324115.7860
337220.2600
364306.1730
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Figure 5

RGDP - Quarterly, 1975 - 2002
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Table 3

Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 1964 - 2002
(Real GDP index - base: 1980 = 100)
Year

GDP

1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

28.9
29.6
31.6
32.9
36.1
39.6
43.7
48.7
54.5
62.0
67.1
70.6
78.0
81.7
85.7
91.6
100.0
95.8
96.5
93.7

Annual
%
Change
3.4%
2.4%
6.7%
4.2%
9.8%
9.5%
10.4%
11.3%
11.9%
14.0%
8.2%
5.2%
10.3%
4.9%
5.0%
6.8%
9.2%
-4.3%
0.8%
-2.9%

Year

GDP

1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

98.8
106.5
114.5
118.6
118.5
122.2
116.8
117.4
116.8
122.5
129.7
135.2
139.0
143.8
142.4
143.6
149.6
160.1
178.6

Annual
%
Change
5.4%
7.8%
7.5%
3.5%
-0.1%
3.2%
-4.4%
1.0%
0.5%
4.9%
5.9%
4.2%
2.7%
3.3%
0.2%
0.8%
4.2%
1.5%
-

Source: APEC (Promoting Association of Economic Studies), APECAO XLII, [Rio de
Janeiro, 2003]. (Primary source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).
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Figure 6

RGDP - Annual Percentage Change, 1964-2002
15.00 %

10.00 %

5 .00 %

0 .00%

- 5 .00 %

- 10 .00 %

Bento 35
Table 4

Quarterly Inflation Rate, 1975 - 2002
Q uarter
1975.1
1975.2
1975.3
1975.4
1976.1
1976.2
1976.3
1976.4
1977.1
1977.2
1977.3
1977.4
1978.1
1978.2
1978.3
1978.4
1979.1
1979.2
1979.3
1979.4
1980.1
1980.2
1980.3
1980.4
1981.1
1981.2
1981.3
1981.4
1982.1
1982.2
1982.3
1982.4
1983.1
1983.2
1983.3
1983.4
1984.1
1984.2

Inflation
6.07%
6.14%
7.21%
6.58%
10.93%
9.84%
11.34%
6.56%
11.06%
2.46%
5.14%
7.46%
9.35%
10.20%
8.04%
7.14%
13.20%
9.56%
10.19%
18.12%
17.01%
17.97%
20.65%
21.09%
22.41%
16.13%
16.88%
13.46%
20.37%
19.47%
15.52%
15.92%
25.66%
28.21%
36.21%
29.25%
32.02%
27.05%

Q uarter
1984.3
1984.4
1985.1
1985.2
1985.3
1985.4
1986.1
1986.2
1986.3
1986.4
1987.1
1987.2
1987.3
1987.4
1988.1
1988.2
1988.3
1988.4
1989.1
1989.2
1989.3
1989.4
1990.1
1990.2
1990.3
1990.4
1991.1
1991.2
1991.3
1991.4
1992.1
1992.2
1992.3
1992.4
1993.1
1993.2
1993.3
1993.4

Source: IPEADATA (www.ipeadata.gov.br)

Inflation
31.45%
32.99%
35.51%
22.84%
32.05%
37.20%
38.29%
0.27%
3.05%
11.41%
41.15%
73.54%
21.85%
41.51%
54.95%
60.67%
70.19%
84.44%
52.59%
44.69%
113.28%
133.36%
224.90%
29.43%
37.62%
48.07%
48.29%
25.13%
44.51%
73.75%
72.33%
62.41%
74.60%
72.86%
83.05%
91.20%
102.48%
108.32%

Q uarter Inflation
129.43%
1994.1
129.99%
1994.2
29.60%
1994.3
5.59%
1994.4
4.32%
1995.1
5.32%
1995.2
2.45%
1995.3
1.83%
1995.4
2.77%
1996.1
3.60%
1996.2
1.22%
1996.3
1.38%
1996.4
3.16%
1997.1
1.59%
1997.2
0.64%
1997.3
1.86%
1997.4
1.13%
1998.1
0.38%
1998.2
-0.57%
1998.3
0.77%
1998.4
7.57%
1999.1
0.71%
1999.2
4.51%
1999.3
5.65%
1999.4
2000.1
1.39%
1.73%
2000.2
4.77%
2000.3
1.52%
2000.4
1.63%
2001.1
3.03%
2001.2
2.90%
2001.3
2001.4
2.39%
0.48%
2002.1
3.55%
2002.2
7.05%
2002.3
12.75%
2002.4
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Figure 7

Inflation (CPI) - Quarterly, 1975 - 2002

Quarter
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Table 5

Annual Inflation Rate, 1964 - 2002
(in percent change in consumer price index)
Year
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

Inflation
83.9%
37.0%
37.6%
24.3%
23.5%
20.0%
19.0%
19.2%
15.6%
15.7%
33.6%
29.0%
45.0%
42.7%
38.7%
53.9%
100.2%
109.9%
95.4%
154.5%

Year
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

Inflation
220.6%
225.5%
142.3%
224.8%
684.5%
1,320.0%
2,739.7%
414.7%
991.4%
2,103.7%
2,406.8%
14.8%
9.3%
4.02%
2.33%
7.67%
4.87%
8.54%
13.09%

Sources:
Rates between 1964 and 1996 - Library of Congress Country Studies (Primary source:
Fundacao Getulio Vargas (FGV), Conjuntura Economica [Rio de Janeiro], various
issues.).
Rates between 1997 and 2002 - Institute Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE),
SIDRA, online. These rates were adjusted to the previous years using the following
mathematical expression:
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Figure 8

Inflation Rate (CPI) - Annually, 1964-2002
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knowledge of statistics and mathematics into the field of economics. I will use the MLA
Guidelines as research style. My research design will consist of using the library, as well
as the internet. I am using both primary and secondary sources in my database. The
paper will be divided into seven parts:
1. A brief introduction of the paper => this will be the beginning o f the paper and
will preview the paper and my findings. This part will be done last in order to
accurately outline the paper. Due date: November 23rd, 2003.
2. A synopsis of Brazil’s economic history => this part will consist of a general view
of Brazil’s economic policy during the time period studied. Due date: .September .
7th, 2003
3. Explanation of the model => this part will describe the economic model I will use
throughout the paper. Due date: September 21st, 2003.
4. Data set => this part will consist of tables of data that will be used in the paper.
Due date: September 14th, 2003.
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5. Application of the model => this part will consist of the application of the Model
of Simple Regression Analysis to my data set. Due date: October 5th, 2003
6. Conclusion => this part will consist of the results of my application of the model
to the data set. It will follow the end of the application of the model. Due date:
October 19lh, 2003.
7. Interpretation => this part will be my interpretation of the conclusion, in which I
will apply my conclusion to Brazil’s past and present economic experiences,
giving an outlook into the future. Due date: November 9th, 2003.

This is a list of courses that provide me with a background for this study:
Econ 260

Math 229

Econ 261

Math 230

Econ 330

Math 232

Econ 360

Math 240

Econ 361

Math 336

Econ 385
Econ 390 (currently enrolled)
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